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According to the Old Testament, the first of Moses’ ten deadly 
plagues was to “strike the water of the Nile . . . [so that] the Egyptians 
w[ould] not be able to drink its water.”1 The implicit policy goal behind 
denying these water rights was to force the Egyptians to free the enslaved 
Jewish population. Water, of course, is indispensable for life. Thousands 
of years later, water is again being used as a policy tool in the region, 
effectively causing the constructive expulsion of the Palestinian 
population of the West Bank. And, like the first plague in biblical 
narrative, water is being used as part of a political machination to 
forcibly remove the residents of the West Bank from their homes. 
  
 * Samit D’Cunha, J.D., M.A., is an LL.M. candidate at the Geneva Academy of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.  
1.Exodus 7:18 (New International Version). 
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In 1967, Israel occupied several territories as part of its military 
campaign in the Six Day War, including the West Bank.2 Since then, the 
West Bank has remained under Israeli military occupation.3 While the 
majority of the Israeli population supports a peace process that sees the 
creation of an independent state of Palestine, elements within the Israeli 
government prefer a plan that sees the entire area formally annexed into 
Israel.4 The largest impediment to such a Thucydidean design is the 2.7 
million Palestinians who currently live in the West Bank.5  
Forcible transfers and deportation have been recognized as some of 
the most abhorrent war crimes in human history.6 Article 49 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention specifically prohibits the deportation of 
people out of occupied territory under belligerent military occupation by 
an occupying power.7 This paper posits, however, that forcible transfers 
are not only merely achieved through explicit deportation or transfer 
plans on the part of an occupying power. Instead, forcible transfers and 
deportations may also be achieved constructively through the production 
of inhabitable conditions that effectively force the local population to 
leave. To be considered a “constructive” transfer, an occupier must act in 
such a way as to make the lives of the local population unlivable and 
cause the departure of local individuals to rise beyond the mere nature of 
a voluntary departure.  
The denial of adequate water rights is a clear means of constructive 
expulsion. Water in the West Bank is, for the most part, under the 
  
 2. Israel and the Occupied Territories: Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18278.htm (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Israel and the Occupied Territories]. 
 3. Id.  
 4. See, e.g., Raphael Ahren, Danny Danon, Opponent of Palestinian State, to be 
Israel’s UN Ambassador, TIMES OF ISR. (Aug. 14, 2015),  
http://www.timesofisrael.com/danny-danon-to-be-israels-next-un-ambassador/. 
 5. This number is based on a July 2014 estimate. The World Factbook: West 
Bank, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2016).  
 6. Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War: Commentary of 1958, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS art. 49, 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?viewComments=LookUpCOMART
&articleUNID=46C5654579157937C12563CD0051BA0C [hereinafter Commentary of 
1958]. 
 7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6.3 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. 
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effective control of Israeli authorities.8 “Water has been on the peace 
process agenda since . . . 1991”9 and yet has been dealt with in minimal 
detail. The denial of adequate water has been used as a means to coerce 
the Palestinian population to abandon the West Bank, and, particularly, 
to abandon Area C.10 
To demonstrate the foregoing proposal, this article will first explore 
the political nature of the West Bank, and whether it is, for the purposes 
of international law, an occupied territory. After establishing the 
applicable law, this paper will explore the legal concept of deportation 
and forcible transfers under international law to better understand how it 
applies to the conflict. This paper will then investigate water deprivation 
in the West Bank. After exploring the legal and policy aspects of water 
deprivation, this paper will offer policy recommendations for this legal 
quandary. 
In order to ensure the fair treatment of the local population of the 
West Bank, three goals must be realized. First, the Palestinian Authority 
must work with the Israeli government to establish an investigative 
committee that cooperates with Israeli authorities in determining 
Palestinian populations at risk in the territories so that both parties may 
ensure adequate water is supplied to these populations, either through 
government subsidies or redistribution plans. Second, water distribution 
in the region must aspire to provide equal per-capita access to all 
individuals living in the West Bank—whether Israeli or Palestinian. 
Finally, if settlements are to continue to subsist in the West Bank, they 
must neither interfere with the current water rights of the local 
Palestinian population nor with the current population centers of the local 
population.  
  
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. B’TSELEM REPORT, THIRSTY FOR A SOLUTION: THE WATER CRISIS IN THE 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND ITS RESOLUTION IN THE FINAL-STATUS AGREEMENT 9 (2000).  
 10. Under the Oslo Accords, the West Bank is divided into three areas of control. 
Area C is “[u]nder full Israeli civil administration and security control . . . [and] is the 
largest division in the West Bank, comprising 60 percent of the territory. The PA only 
has responsibility for providing education and medical services to the 150,000 
Palestinians living there.” Israel also has “full authority over building permissions and 
zoning laws” in Area C. Finally, “Area C contains most of the West Bank’s natural 
resources and open areas.” Ehab Zahriveh, Maps: The occupation of the West Bank, AL 
JAZEERA AMERICA (July 4, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2014/7/west-
bank-security.html.  
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I. DETERMINATION OF THE APPLICABLE LAW IN THE WEST BANK 
Armed conflicts are governed by International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL), comprising mainly of the 1907 Hague Conventions (particularly 
the regulations found in the annex of Hague IV),11 the four Geneva 
Conventions,12 their two Additional Protocols,13 and customary 
international law.14 IHL only applies in specific situations in which it 
replaces other rules of national and international law, and thus, it is lex 
specialis.15 When no armed conflict exists, lex generalis—general 
international law—applies.16 This is why, for example, targeting 
combatants in an armed conflict is not always a violation of their right to 
life; by explicitly prohibiting the targeting of civilians and other persons 
(such as wounded, sick, or shipwrecked combatants), IHL implicitly 
  
 11. Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, INT’L COMM. OF 
THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195 [hereinafter Convention IV, 1907]. 
Eighteen states are party to an earlier version of this treaty, the 1899 Convention, but 
have not signed on to this one. Thus, the 1907 Treaty does not apply to those eighteen 
states. Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria (belligerents in the 1967 war) are party to the 1907 
Convention and so the 1899 Convention does not apply to relations between them. 
 12. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Convention IV].  
 13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
 14. For example, regarding the attribution of acts, a well-established rule of 
customary international law dictates that the conduct of any organ of a State is regarded 
as an act of that State. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, ¶ 87 
(April 29), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/100/7619.pdf. 
 15. This governance is dubbed the Law of Armed Conflict. An example of lex 
specialis can be found in Article 23 of the Convention IV, which states that it is unlawful 
“[t]o kill or wound [enemy forces] treacherously.” Convention IV, supra note 12, art. 23 
(emphasis added). 
 16. See id., art. 23.  
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permits targeting, and killing, combatants. Each body of law has special 
rules for states in a given situation, and therefore, any examination of the 
legality of a state’s action must begin with a determination of which 
body of law applies.17 Since lex generalis applies whenever lex specialis 
does not, the applicability of either body of law is governed by the 
applicability of the latter.18  
While it is clear that the West Bank was occupied during an 
international armed conflict, during which time IHL applied, the status of 
the West Bank is currently disputed, and thus, it must be clarified 
whether the continued Israeli presence in the region is either an 
occupation (and thus subject to rules of IHL) or whether the West Bank 
is merely a disputed territory where IHL does not apply. Occupations 
are, for the most part, governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention, to 
which Israel is a party.19 
Some Israeli legal authorities have stated that the West Bank is part of 
a disputed territory, and is not an occupied territory. Meir Shamgar, 
while attorney-general of Israel, made this argument, justifying, if Israel 
desired, Israel’s refusal to apply IHL to the West Bank, including the 
Geneva Conventions and the Hague regulations.20 The soundest legal 
argument supporting this conclusion is that no “High Contracting Party” 
of the Geneva Conventions controlled the West Bank prior to Israel.21 
Since the Fourth Geneva Convention, which protects civilian victims of 
war, applies only to “cases of . . . occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party,” it does not apply to the West Bank.22 After the end of 
the British Mandate on Palestine, the West Bank was captured by 
Transjordan (today, the Kingdom of Jordan), and annexed shortly 
  
 17. Id. 
 18. For a discussion on the principles of lex specialis and lex generalis under 
international law, see Rep. of the Int’l L. Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 
11, 2006, at 408, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, at 49, 54-56 (2006).  
 19. Geneva Conventions of 1949: Israel, INT’L COMM. FOR THE RED CROSS, 
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&document
Id=35D52356F487FC85C1256402003F9563 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
 20. Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered 
Territories, reprinted in THE PROGRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: FOUR DECADES OF 
THE ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 429, 430-31 (Yoram Einstein & Fania Domb 
eds., 2011).  
 21. Id. 
 22. Convention IV, supra note 12, art. 2.  
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thereafter.23 It was subsequently captured from the Kingdom of Jordan by 
Israel in 1967.24 Since Palestine is not a High Contracting Party (that is, 
since it is not a state) the Geneva Conventions do not apply.  
This argument is dubious. Israel captured the territory from 
Transjordan, which itself was an occupying power of the West Bank.25 If 
Israel does not recognize occupation of the West Bank as possible, since 
it has no legitimate authority, it follows that Transjordan’s control and 
annexation of the territory would instead, under the Israeli argument, 
mean that Transjordan was the first legitimate sovereign of the territory. 
Essentially, both Israel and Jordan have equal (albeit illegitimate) claims 
to Palestine under international law; if Israel’s argument is wrong, then 
neither Jordan nor Israel is the legitimate sovereign of Palestine. 
Conversely, if Israel’s argument is correct, then Jordan was the 
legitimate sovereign from 1948 onwards because it captured the territory 
under circumstances almost identical to Israel’s.26 Regardless of the legal 
position, Israel is never the legitimate sovereign of Palestine. In 1988, 
Jordan recognized the independence of Palestine and renounced all 
claims to the territory.27 Therefore, even under Israel’s own logic, 
Palestine would be an independent state since it was granted 
independence by its first legitimate sovereign, Jordan. Since Palestine, 
even under the Israeli argument, would be an independent state, the 
Geneva Conventions apply to the continued military occupation of the 
West Bank.  
Regardless of Palestinian statehood, however, Palestine is still an 
occupied territory and the Geneva Conventions still apply. The Israeli 
argument summarized above relies on Article 2, paragraph 2 of the 
  
 23. The Constituent Assembly First Knesset 1949-1951: Annexation of the West 
Bank by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS, 
http://www.jcpa.org/art/knesset6.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2015) [hereinafter The 
Constituent Assembly First Knesset 1949-1951].  
 24. Israel and the Occupied Territories, supra note 2.  
 25. The Constituent Assembly First Knesset 1949-1951, supra note 23.  
 26. Israel and the Occupied Territories, supra note 2.  
 27. Address to the Nation, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/88_july31.html (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2016). Jordan also recognized the PLO as the “sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people” in 1974. Seventh Arab League Summit 
Conference Resolution on Palestine, UNISPAL,  
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/3d14c9e5cdaa296d85256cbf005aa3eb/63d9a
930e2b428df852572c0006d06b8?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).  
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Fourth Geneva Convention to find that the Convention cannot begin to 
apply during a partial or total occupation of a territory not belonging to 
any state.28 However, even if the Israeli argument’s premise that 
Palestine is not a state is correct, the Fourth Geneva Convention still 
applies in the West Bank. The Fourth Geneva Convention is quite clear 
on the temporal scope of the law of occupation: once an occupation 
begins, all articles of the Convention apply until one year after the 
general close of military operations and a vast majority of the articles 
continue to apply “for the duration of the occupation.”29 This includes, 
crucially for the purposes of this writing, Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.30 While Palestine’s status as an independent state may still 
be marginally controversial (and therefore, Israel has argued it is at best 
unclear whether it can be considered a “High Contracting Party”), it is 
undisputed that Jordan and Israel were states in 1967; therefore, their 
resort to force in the 1967 Six Day War was an armed conflict fulfilling 
the requirements of Article 2 of the Fourth Convention. Furthermore, 
international jurisprudence has also recognized the West Bank as an 
occupied territory. Notably, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
which is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and provides 
opinions based on international law, recognized the West Bank as an 
occupied territory in its July 9, 2004 Advisory Opinion, basing its logic 
in part on the definition of occupation found in the Hague Convention.31 
Importantly, the court noted that “[s]ubsequent events in these territories 
. . . have done nothing to alter this situation. All these territories 
(including East Jerusalem) remain occupied territories and Israel has 
continued to have the status of occupying Power.”32 
State practice overwhelmingly recognizes the existence of a 
belligerent occupation in the West Bank. The United States, one of 
  
 28. See Convention IV, supra note 12, art. 2. 
 29. Convention IV, supra note 12, art. 6 (“In the case of occupied territory, the 
application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general close of 
military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of 
the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in 
such territory . . . .”).  
 30. Id. 
 31. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 78 (July 9) [hereinafter Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall]. 
 32. Id. 
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Israel’s most important allies, recognizes the West Bank as an occupied 
territory.33 In addition to the United States’ recognition of the West Bank 
as an occupied territory, 134 countries of the world (nearly 70% of the 
world’s nation-states representing an overwhelming majority of the 
world population) recognize Palestine as an independent nation-state. 
Moreover, the UN General Assembly recognizes Palestine as an 
independent nation-state.34 The United Nations Security Council, in 
1967, recognized the territories taken by Israel as occupied territories.35 
In a later resolution, the Security Council specifically called on “Israel, 
as the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by the [1949 Fourth] 
Geneva Convention . . . and to desist from taking any action . . . 
materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab territories 
occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.”36 Thus, it follows that the 
uninvited presence of the Israeli military is a belligerent occupation. 
Peculiarly, even the Israeli government has argued in domestic Israeli 
court that the West Bank is an occupied territory.37 In 2005, the Israeli 
High Court of Justice (Israel’s Supreme Court) recognized the West 
Bank as an occupied territory.38 Thus, as far as state practice is 
concerned, those continuing to argue that the West Bank is not an 
occupied territory are few and far between. 
For the purposes of the Geneva Conventions, the West Bank is an 
occupied territory. Before turning to the application of its articles, it is 
important to establish that military operations are closed. The 
Commentary of the Fourth Geneva Convention offers guidance on when 
  
 33. See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN 
RIGHTS & LABOR, ISRAELI 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204575.pdf (referring to “Israel and the 
Occupied Territories”).  
 34. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3210 (XXIX), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3210 (Oct. 14, 
1974) (recognizing the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people); G.A. Res. 
43/177, ¶1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/177 (Dec. 15, 1988) (recognizing “the proclamation of 
the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on 15 November 1988”); G.A. 
Res. 67/19, ¶28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/19 (Dec. 4, 2012) (according Palestine UN non-
member observer-state status). 
 35. S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 1 (Nov. 22, 1967). 
 36. S.C. Res. 446, ¶ 3 (Mar. 22, 1979). 
 37. See GERSHOM GORENBERG, THE ACCIDENTAL EMPIRE: ISRAEL AND THE BIRTH 
OF THE SETTLEMENTS, 1967–1977 363 (2007). 
 38. See, e.g., HCJ 2690/09 Yesh Din v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the 
West Bank [2009] (Isr.) (calling the territory an “occupied territory”). 
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operations are considered closed. Military operations, according to the 
commentary, end either “‘when the last shot has been fired’” or when 
there is “an armistice, capitulation or simply ‘debellatio.’”39 The 1967 
war ended on June 10, 1967, when the last shot was fired, after Israel had 
defeated its enemies.40 Thus, military operations in the West Bank are 
closed.  
It follows that, under Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
Israel is bound by the following articles of the Convention even one year 
after the general close of military operations: 1 through 12, 27, 29 
through 34, 47, 49, 51 through 53, 59, 61 through 77, and 143.41 
Moreover, Israel is bound by Security Council Resolution 446 to not 
“materially” affect the demographic composition of the West Bank.42   
II. THE SCOPE OF DEPORTATION & FORCIBLE TRANSFERS UNDER 
ARTICLE 49 OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION  
According to Article 49(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
“individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of 
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the 
Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are 
prohibited, regardless of their motive.”43 Transfers are generally 
considered to be the intra-state relocation of a person, while deportation 
is the transfer of a person across a state line.44 The total prohibition of 
  
 39. Convention IV, supra note 12, art. 6.  
 40. Six Days of War, June 5-10, 1967, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFFICE OF THE 
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/ch2 (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2014). 
 41. Convention IV, supra note 12, art. 6 (clarifies that the foregoing articles of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention continue to apply after the close of military operations, 
but before the close of military operations all articles apply). 
 42. S.C. Res. 446, supra note 36. 
 43. Convention IV, supra note 12, art. 49. 
 44. While the deportations and forced transfers are often conflated, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which is charged with 
interpreting the Geneva Conventions as well as customary international law, has 
distinguished deportation’s actus rei from a de jure or de facto state line, in 
contradistinction to forced transfers. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24, 
Judgment, ¶278 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 26, 2006), available 
at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/acjug/en/sta-aj060322e.pdf (“[T]he actus reus of 
deportation is the forced displacement of persons by expulsion or other forms of coercion 
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deportation and forced transfers, outside of limited and narrow 
exceptions that do not apply in the present case,45 arose from “the painful 
recollections called forth by the ‘deportations’ of the Second World 
War.”46 While it was previously understood that deportations and forced 
transfers were so horrific a crime that they fell into “abeyance,” and thus, 
need not be addressed,47 the experience of World War II made clear that 
the prohibition needed to be codified. 
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention was written to address 
the physically coercive forcible transfers of occupied populations that 
occurred during the Second World War.48 However, the meaning of 
Article 49 has since been interpreted to include transfers of populations 
without their genuine consent.49 Recognizing whether consent of the 
displaced exists includes analyzing the context of the displacement.50 A 
state may, when it intends to forcibly transfer or deport a population, 
make the conditions in a given region so unlivable that a population is 
forced to leave without genuinely consenting to being displaced. 
Imagine, for example, two opposing belligerents in an armed conflict, 
State A and State B. Each has militarily conquered and is occupying a 
segment of territory from the other. Both intend to transfer out the local 
populations of their occupied territories. State A initiates a policy 
demanding the local population leave the occupied territory and find 
refuge elsewhere. State B cuts off all sources of water into the occupied 
territory to any individual who is part of the local population. Individuals 
in both territories leave. Both intentionally instituted a policy forcing the 
local population to leave the occupied territory, regardless of the means. 
  
from the area in which they are lawfully present, across a de jure state border or, in 
certain circumstances, a de facto border, without grounds permitted under international 
law. The Appeals Chamber considers that the mens rea of the offence does not require 
that the perpetrator intend to displace the individual across the border on a permanent 
basis.”). 
 45. Commentary of 1958, supra note 6 (“The prohibition is absolute and allows 
of no exceptions, apart from those stipulated in paragraph 2.”). 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 
229 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003). 
 50. Id. 
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While there is as of yet no precedent for such an interpretation under 
international criminal law or international humanitarian law for such a 
specific reading of Article 49, an international tribunal has recognized 
the existence of ‘constructive expulsion.’ The Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal was established to address the claims arising out of the 1979 
hostage crisis at the United States’ embassy in Iran and the freezing of 
Iranian assets.51 The tribunal was composed of three United States’ 
judges, three Iranian judges, and three judges appointed by the first six.52  
In Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, a United States’ national, and 
employee of Lockheed Martin, lived under increasing stress because of 
anti-American threats and violence, culminating during the return of 
Khomeini, the leader of the revolution.53 The tribunal ultimately did not 
find Iran liable because Short failed to establish his departure was caused 
by Iran. However, the tribunal did note that an individual could be 
wrongfully expelled “in the absence of any order of specific state 
action.”54 Judge Charles M. Brower of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal wrote a dissenting opinion noting that an individual could be 
constructively expelled by circumstances arising out of state policy, and 
found that Khomenei’s statements were part of a policy that caused the 
“rather complete exodus of Americans from Iran.”55  
Comparatively, in Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran,56 the tribunal 
found Iran liable for the wrongful expulsion of a United States’ 
national.57 This case differed from Short in that it involved harassment by 
Iran’s revolutionary guard.58  
Constructive forcible transfers or deportations will also often, by their 
very nature, involve other violations of international law related to 
  
 51. About the Tribunal, IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL,  
https://www.iusct.net/Pages/Public/A-About.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2016).  
 52. Id.  
 53. Ruth L. Cove, State Responsibility for Constructive Wrongful Expulsion of 
Foreign Nationals, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 802, 807 (1987).  
 54. Short v. Iran, No. 312-11135-3, 1987 WL 503820, at *6 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. July 14, 1987). 
 55. Cove, supra note 53, at 807 n.43. 
 56. Yeager v. Iran, No. 324-10199-1, 1987 WL 503859 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. Nov. 2, 1987). 
 57. Id. at *12.  
 58. Compare Cove, supra note 53, at 807, with Yeager, 1987 WL 503859 
503820, at *2.  
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military occupation. Often, the only way to accomplish a constructive 
forcible transfer is by committing other acts already prohibited by 
international law. One example of this is the destruction of property in an 
occupied territory. According to Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, “[a]ny destruction by the Occupying Power of real or 
personal property belonging individually or collectively to private 
persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or 
cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is 
rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.”59 To this, Meir 
Shamgar points to the commentary of Article 53, which states in part that 
the prohibition on destruction of property does not apply in cases where 
“imperative military requirements so demand,” and that it is “for the 
Occupying power to judge the importance of such military 
requirements.”60 However, no military operations or objectives currently 
exist in the West Bank that would systematically trigger the high 
threshold for destruction rendered “absolutely necessary by military 
operations” exception. It has already been noted that military operations 
in the West Bank are closed.61 While the exception can still apply even 
after the general close of military operations,62 and it is true that 
determining the importance of the military requirements is left to the 
occupying power, the occupying power is not immune to external 
scrutiny, particularly when the destruction is particularly egregious vis-à-
vis this exception. It is for this reason that the ICJ, when faced with the 
same question, did not simply defer to the Israeli position on Article 53, 
but found, on the contrary, that Israel’s destruction of property in the 
West Bank was not “absolutely necessary.”63 
Aside from Article 53, public or private property can only be targeted 
if the property is a “military objective.”64 There is no clear definition of 
  
 59. Convention IV, supra note 12, art. 53. 
 60. Commentary of 1958, supra note 6 (emphasis added).  
 61. See supra notes 39-40.  
 62. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 31, ¶ 
135. 
 63. Id. 
 64. The basic principle of limiting the use of force to “military objectives” was 
first articulated in the Saint Petersburg declaration of 1868. It has since become a 
fundamental rule of international humanitarian law. See Rule 8: Definition of Military 
Objectives, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule8#Fn_54_4 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2016). 
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what constitutes “military objectives” under customary international 
law.65 The First Additional Protocol, to which Israel is not a party, 
defines “military objectives” as, in part, “those objects which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose . . . destruction . . . in the circumstances ruling 
at the time, offers a definitive military advantage.”66 The Commentary of 
the First Additional Protocol67 makes further references to the definition 
found in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict68 as partially defining military 
objectives. It states, in part, that military objectives are properties that 
are:  
(a) [not] situated at an adequate distance from any large industrial 
centre or from any   important military objective constituting a 
vulnerable point, such as, for example, an   aerodrome, broadcasting 
station, establishment engaged upon work of national defence, a  port 
or railway station of relative importance or a main line of 
communication;  
(b) . . . used for military purposes.69  
  
 65. See, e.g., CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 631 (Yves 
Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) (“[T]here was no agreed definition of such objectives, and in 
fact, during the Second World War and during several armed conflicts which have taken 
place since then, each belligerent determined what should be understood by such 
objectives as it pleased . . . . Thus a restrictive definition was necessary if the essential 
distinction between combatants and civilians and between civilian objects and military 
objectives was to be maintained.”).  
 66. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 52, 
¶ 2, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 67. Israel is not a signatory of the Additional Protocols of the Geneva 
Conventions, but the commentaries still provide insight on customary law and 
international legal interpretation. 
 68. Israel ratified the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict. For a list of state-parties to the treaty, see Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, ICRC, 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=2
A07EB0EAA5CECACC12563CD002D6BC8 (last visited Dec. 19, 2015).  
 69. Rule 8: Definition of Military Objectives, supra note 64. 
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Therefore, property cannot be destroyed merely because its existence 
violates a military order if that property has nothing to do with military 
purposes or military use or if the property is going to be destroyed for its 
proximity to military resources.  
The Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, 70 which Israel swiftly implemented following the capture of the 
West Bank in 1967,71 regulates conduct to ensure constructive transfer 
and deportations do not occur. For example, Regulation 53 states that 
“[a]n army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and 
realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State, depots of 
arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable 
property belonging to the State which may be used for military 
operations.”72 Accordingly, the appropriation of private property or 
public resources that cannot be used for military operations is illegal.  
III. WATER REGULATION IN THE WEST BANK 
Water is an essential resource that must be allocated among any 
population of a given territory without discrimination based on 
citizenship, race, or religion. The United Nations’ Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) stated in 2003 that “[t]he 
human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, 
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic 
uses.”73 The CESCR’s Comment provides valuable policy guidance. It is 
also the framework for an important self-evident truth: without access to 
potable water, humans cannot maintain a sedentary life. Water, a 
fundamental building block for life and for civilization, has far-reaching 
  
 70. Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague IV]. 
 71. See, e.g., Howard Grief, A Legal Discourse on Occupation, JERUSALEM 
SUMMIT (June 10, 2007), http://www.jerusalemsummit.org/eng/razdel-inn.php?id=189 
(noting that after the military engagement in the West Bank, “the National Unity 
Government headed by Levi Eshkol instantly applied Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations to keep the existing laws in force”).  
 72. Convention IV, 1907, supra note 11, art. 53 (emphasis added).  
 73. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising 
in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: General Comment No. 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/escgencom15.htm (emphasis added). 
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uses which those living in the first world may often take for granted. The 
CESCR, in its General Comment, further noted the wide-ranging 
purposes for water beyond merely personal and domestic uses, including 
the production of food, environmental hygiene and health, securing 
livelihood, and enjoying cultural practices.74 The CESCR clarified that 
“water should be treated as a social and cultural good, and not primarily 
as an economic good”75 and, notably, that states must distribute water 
“without discrimination.”76 While the CESCR’s understanding of water 
as a resource seems exceedingly obvious, water distribution in the West 
Bank has been fundamentally unfair and demonstrates a failure of 
relevant authorities to take heed of the CESCR’s conclusions. The 
distribution of water, owing to a confluence of factors, has left the local 
population of the West Bank with a shortage of water leading to 
devastating consequences on daily life.77 The local population that do not 
have access to water cannot maintain a sedentary life, and these segments 
are thus effectively forced to relocate. 
A. Appropriation of Water Resources in the Aftermath of the Six 
Day War 
Following the Six Day War, Israel issued several military orders 
which curtailed the West Bank local population’s right to water. Military 
Order 92 gave “the absolute authority of controlling all issues related to 
water to the Water Officer who is appointed by the Israeli courts.”78 Four 
days later, Military Order 58 was issued, which prohibited the 
construction of any new water installations without a license.79 This order 
  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See generally Edith Garwood, Troubled Waters: Palestinians Denied Fair 
Access to Water, HUMAN RIGHTS NOW BLOG (Oct. 29, 2009),  
http://blog.amnestyusa.org/middle-east/troubled-waters-palestinians-denied-fair-access-
to-water/. 
 78. Appendix 1 Israeli Military Orders Regarding Water, PALESTINIAN WATER 
AUTHORITY, http://www.pwa.ps/page.aspx?id=Yy1DfNa1609414323aYy1DfN (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2015) (“[I]t is prohibited to construct any new water installation without 
a license and that the licensing officer has the right of rejecting any application for a 
license without having to give the justification for his rejection.”). 
 79. Id. 
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is particularly important for the current examination given the broad 
power Military Order 92 already bestowed upon the Israeli Water 
Officer, as it allowed Licensing Officers, who are appointed by the 
Water Officer, to reject applications without any basis.80 Given the broad 
power entrusted to the Water Officer by the Israeli military, there is no 
meaningful review of the rejections by Licensing Officers.81 Military 
Order 158 ordered that all wells, springs, and water projects would 
thereafter be under the full, direct command of the Israeli Military 
Commander.82 Crucially, military orders apply to the local population in 
the West Bank, but they do not apply to Israeli citizens in the West 
Bank—that is, Israeli settlers.83 As a result, the aforementioned military 
orders apply inherently discriminatory water policies on the local 
population of the West Bank.84  
In addition to Military Orders, the Israeli military actively destroyed 
local population water projects while simultaneously building Israeli 
projects. According to a report by the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council, Israeli authorities destroyed approximately 140 water 
pumps belonging to the local population of the West Bank, which 
prevented local farmers from continuing agricultural irrigation in the 
  
 80. Id. 
 81. See Israel Military Order No. 92 Concerning Powers for the Purpose of the 
Water Provisions, ISRAEL LAW RES. CTR.,  
http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israelmilitaryorders/fulltext/mo0092.htm (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2014) (emphasis added) (noting that the water officer is “entrusted with 
all the powers conferred by the Water Provisions”) (emphasis added).  
 82. See Ilaria Gigliori, Rights, Citizenship and Territory: Water Politics in the 
West Bank, in THE RIGHT TO WATER: POLITICS, GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL STRUGGLES 
(1st ed. 2012).  
 83. ILAN PELEG, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA: LEGACY AND 
POLITICS 76 (Syracuse Univ. Press 1st ed. 1995). 
 84. While Israel has an obligation to refrain from applying domestic Israeli law to 
occupied populations, it cannot leverage this prohibition to intentionally discriminate 
against the local population, forcing them to leave. If Israel insists on transferring parts of 
the Israeli population to the West Bank, which in and of itself is contrary to international 
law then it is ipso facto forced to violate Article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention as well 
for reasons outlined in this paper, since these transfers contribute to the inhabitable 
conditions for the local population in the West Bank. See, e.g., Rule 130: Transfer of 
Own Civilian Population into Occupied Territory, ICRC,  
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter38_rule130 (last visited Jan. 
6, 2016).  
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region.85 The military also destroyed irrigation canals along citrus and 
banana plantations.86 These destructions were done on the basis of 
establishing a new “security belt.”87 Meanwhile, hydrological surveys by 
Israeli settlement authorities together with Merkorot, Israel’s national 
water company, were undertaken, leading to the construction, by 1985, 
of over thirty new wells in the West Bank solely for Israeli settlers.88 In 
1982, Israel transferred its water authority to Mekorot.89 The cooperation 
between the Israeli military and its settlement authority proved highly 
successful at inhibiting Palestinian access to water. By 2007, 217,000 
Palestinians (about 10% of the West Bank’s local population) lived in 
communities without access to a running water network.90 According to 
the World Bank, this population is forced to find natural springs or use 
cisterns and tankers, paying over four times more, for poorer quality 
water than water from the network.91 These communities, which are 
exclusively in Area C, spend up to 40% of their income on water.92 By 
contrast, in 2007, all 149 Israeli settlements, all within Area C, were 
connected to a running water network.93 The pipes that connect to these 
settlements often run near Palestinian dwellings, but Israel does not 
permit Palestinians to connect to them.94 Thus, Area C Palestinians are 
  
 85. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General Prepared in 
Pursuance of General Assembly Decision 39/442, ¶ 202, U.N. Doc. A/40/381-
E/1985/105 (June 17, 1985).  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. JAN SELBY, WATER, POWER AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE OTHER 
ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT 81 (I.B. Tauris 2003). 
 90. THE WORLD BANK, REPORT NO. 47657-GZ, WEST BANK AND GAZA: 
ASSESSMENT ON RESTRICTIONS OF WATER SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 17, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WaterRestrictions
Report18Apr2009.pdf [hereinafter ASSESSMENT ON RESTRICTIONS OF WATER SECTOR 
DEVELOPMENT]. 
 91. Id. at V. 
 92. Amira Hass, Just How Much Do Palestinians Rely on Israel for Water?, 
HAARETZ (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/.premium-
1.573976. 
 93. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INTERNATIONAL, WATER INJUSTICE IN PALESTINE: A 
LIMITING FACTOR FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Water-injustice-in-Palestine.pdf (noting 
that “all Israeli colonies in the West Bank are connected to piped water”). 
 94. Hass, supra note 92.  
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particularly pressured to leave their territory in search for adequate 
water.  
B. Water Regulation Under the Oslo Accords and its Effects 
Hope for increased water rights began with the Oslo negotiations, and, 
particularly, with the signing, between the Israeli government and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), of the “Israeli and Palestinian 
Authority Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” also 
known as the “Oslo Accords”95 However, rather than providing hope, the 
Oslo Accords represent the greatest failure of the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process in regards to water rights as it exacerbated the problem, 
and, as a result, aggravated tensions between Israel and the local 
population of the West Bank. The agreement specifically addressed 
water rights, noting, in Article 40(1) that “Israel recognizes the 
Palestinian water rights in the West Bank.”96 The Palestinian Water 
Authority (PWA) was created by a Presidential decree in Palestine to 
uphold their responsibilities under the Oslo agreement.97 The PWA was 
meant to be responsible for, inter alia, managing water resources and 
monitoring water projects.98 However, the interim agreements had two 
fatal shortcomings.  
  
 95. This paper is particularly concerned with “Oslo II.” For a complete version of 
the accords, see Israel and Palestinian Authority: Interim Agreement on the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip: Annex III, ISR. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/THE%20ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN%20INTERIM%20AGREEMENT%20-%20Annex%20III.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Oslo].  
 96. Id. 
 97. AMANDA CAHILL RIPLEY, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER AND ITS APPLICATION 
IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 80 (Routledge 2011).  
 98. EURO-MEDITERRANEAN INFO. SYS. ON KNOW-HOW IN THE WATER SECTOR, 
LOCAL WATER SUPPLY, SANITATION, AND SEWAGE: COUNTRY REPORT: PALESTINE 8 
(2005), available at  
http://www.emwis.org/documents/emwis-main-studies/studies-
country/Palestine_Final.pdf. 
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1. Estimated Water Needs 
First, interestingly, the agreement made particular mention of the 
amount of water required for Palestinians. For example, the Accords 
specifically mentioned that the Israelis and Palestinians “agreed that the 
future needs of the Palestinians in the West Bank are estimated to be 
between 70 - 80 mcm/year.”99 In addition to the alarming authority both 
sides vested in themselves to decide the absolute needs of a future 
population, this clause is troubling for several reasons.  
Peculiarly, even if you take the higher estimate (80 mcm/year), this is 
equivalent to 219,178 cubic meters/day (80,000,000/365). The local 
population of the West Bank is over 2.8 million.100 This results in, even 
in ideal standards according to the Oslo Accords, approximately ninety-
one liters per capita per day (lpcd),101 which is still below international 
standards for adequate water according to the World Health 
Organization, which defines 100-150 lpcd as adequate.102 In reality, 
according to a World Bank report,103 supply rates are much lower, 
totaling, in a quarter of connected populations, to be less than fifty lpcd, 
and to about 16% of Area C’s southern population, less than twenty 
lpcd.104  
Corroborating the World Bank report, B’Tselem and Amnesty 
International estimate Palestinians in the West Bank have access to 
approximately seventy lpcd.105 Amnesty International has found that 
some Palestinians have access to as little as ten to twenty lpcd, which is 
comparable to water access in refugee camps in Sudan and the Congo.106 
  
 99. Oslo, supra note 95 (emphasis added). 
 100. The World Factbook: West Bank, supra note 5. 
 101. Calculated by dividing 219,179 cubic meters by the Palestinian population of 
2.4 million, and multiplying by 1,000 to obtain liters. 
 102. See ASSESSMENT ON RESTRICTIONS OF WATER SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, supra 
note 90, at 17 (according to the World Bank, the consumption level should “be compared 
with the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended standard of 100 lpcd for 
optimal water supply, as well as with the ‘15 lpcd, 500 meters minimum distance to 
source’ criterion adopted by international humanitarian disaster response agencies”).  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Discriminatory Water Supply, B’TSELEM (March 10, 2014),  
http://www.btselem.org/water/discrimination_in_water_supply. 
 106. ASSESSMENT ON RESTRICTIONS OF WATER SECTOR DEVELOPMENT¸ supra note 
90, at 17.  
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By comparison, the average settler has access to an estimated 300 lpcd, 
which is access to thirty times more water than some Palestinians per 
capita.107 The amount of water available to the average Palestinian is now 
less than was available at any time since the start of the occupation in 
1967.108 
According to Israeli authorities, “[w]ater matters, like other civil 
powers, have been for some time under the full responsibility of the 
P.A.”109 Additionally, Israeli authorities claim that “[j]urisdiction over 
water was transferred [to the P.A.] completely and on time.”110 However, 
as Amnesty International points out, this is untrue.111 According to 
Amnesty International, under the Oslo Accords, the P.A. only gained 
“responsibility for managing the supply of the insufficient quantity of 
water allocated for use by the Palestinian population.”112 Israeli 
authorities also state that they are “aware of the water shortage in the 
territories, which is part of the general water shortage in [both Israel and 
the West Bank].”113 However, as noted earlier, the Israeli settlers in the 
West Bank, numbering only about 340,000, have access to an average of 
300 liters of water per person, per day. 114 Settlers use this access to water 
for personal use, but also to perpetuate industries in the occupied 
territories.115  
  
 107. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TROUBLED WATERS – PALESTINIANS DENIED FAIR 
ACCESS TO WATER 3 (2009), available at  
https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdf/mde150272009en.pdf [hereinafter AMNESTY REPORT]. 
 108. Id. at 10. 
 109. The Water Issue in the West Bank and Gaza, ISR. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(June 24, 1999),  
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20water%20issue%20i
n%20the%20west%20bank%20and%20gaza.aspx. 
 110. Id. 
 111. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 107, at 17 (“In truth, however, the PA did not 
acquire control of water resources in the OPT under the Oslo Accords.”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. The Water Issue in the West Bank and Gaza, supra note 109. 
 114. The World Factbook: West Bank, supra note 5. 
 115. Ripe for Abuse Palestinian Child Labor in Israeli Agricultural Settlements in 
the West Bank, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (April 13, 2015),  
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settlements in the occupied portion of the Jordan Valley, for example, are cultivated with 
date palms, field crops, and produce, and the amount of water provided to these 
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The arbitrary amount of water the drafters of Oslo assumed was 
needed by the local population is entirely incorrect. Oddly, it does not 
address the “needs” of Israeli settlers, who, as stated above, use on 
average over four times what the local population use per capita.116 
Instead of providing water security to the local population of the West 
Bank, Oslo further alienated the local population from their fundamental 
right to water.117 The amount of water needed by the local population 
should be based on a calculation of the product of the satisfactory 
amount required by the World Health Organization118 and the population 
of the West Bank. The Palestinian negotiators at Oslo likely agreed to the 
unfair stipulation in Oslo II because it was meant to lead to a permanent 
settlement in five years.119 Thus, Palestinian negotiators believed they 
would gain complete control over the water in the near future anyway. In 
making such an agreement, however, they failed the Palestinian people, 
and have, rather ironically, been instrumental in allowing the 
constructive forced transfer of the West Bank’s local population. 
2. Structure of the JWC 
The Oslo Accords also created the Joint Water Committee (JWC), 
which has the authority to permit or deny water projects.120 The JWC is 
composed of an equal number of Palestinians and Israelis, and is 
ostensibly meant to provide fair representation.121 However, all decisions 
  
settlements alone is equal to one quarter of the entire water supply of the West Bank’s 
Palestinian population).  
 116. ASSESSMENT ON RESTRICTIONS OF WATER SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 
90, at 17. 
 117. The General Assembly recognized access to safe, clean drinking water as a 
basic human right in 2010. See G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 
2010). 
 118. This number is currently 100-150 lpcd. See ASSESSMENT ON RESTRICTIONS OF 
WATER SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 90, at 17. 
 119. Amira Hass, The Israeli ‘Watergate’ Scandal: The Facts About Palestinian 
Water, HAARETZ (Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.574554. 
 120. Oslo, supra note 95, app. 1, art. 40(11). 
 121. HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST 
PROJECT OF THE DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME, OCCUPATION, 
COLONIALISM, APARTHEID? A RE-ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL’S PRACTICES IN THE OCCUPIED 
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (2009), available at 
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made by the JWC require consensus.122 Thus, in principle, Israelis have 
veto power over all projects initiated by Palestinians. Though 
Palestinians should have the same authority, Israel conducts water 
projects even if Palestinians veto the proposal.123 Due to the dramatic 
imbalance of power, the JWC merely institutionalizes the power that 
Israel already wields in limiting the use of water by Palestinians while 
maximizing the use of water by Israeli settlers. Thus, according to the 
World Bank,  
JWC has not fulfilled its role of providing an effective collaborative 
governance framework for joint resource management and investment. 
. . . The JWC does not function as a “joint” water resource governance 
institution because of fundamental asymmetries – of power, of 
capacity, of information, of interests – that prevent the development of 
a consensual approach to resolving water management conflicts.124 
Moreover, since military law supersedes civil administrative decisions, 
Israeli Military Orders may still veto projects even when they are 
approved by the JWC.  
In addition to Article 40, which deals specifically with water, the Oslo 
accords divided the West Bank in three areas: Area A, Area B, and Area 
C.125 Areas A and B, mostly population centers under Palestinian Civil 
control, comprise approximately 40% of the territory of the West 
Bank.126 The remaining 60%, Area C, is under total Israeli control and 
includes most of the resources and infrastructure needed to support Areas 
A and B.127 Areas A and B are themselves essentially districts within 
Area C.128 Additionally, all Israeli settlements, with the exception of the 
  
http://www.alhaq.org/attachments/article/236/Occupation_Colonialism_Apartheid-
FullStudy.pdf [hereinafter SOUTH AFRICA REPORT]. 
 122. Oslo, supra note 95, art. 40(14). 
 123. SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, supra note 121, at 143-44. 
 124. ASSESSMENT ON RESTRICTIONS OF WATER SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 
90, at ix. 
 125. Oslo, supra note 95, art. 11.  
 126. What is Area C?, B’TSELEM (Oct. 9, 2013),  
http://www.btselem.org/area_c/what_is_area_c. 
 127. ASSESSMENT ON RESTRICTIONS OF WATER SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 
90, at ix. 
 128. What is Area C?, supra note 126. 
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Hebron settlement, are located in Area C.129 As it is under Israeli control, 
it is the area most susceptible to forcible transfer of the local population, 
and subsequent usurpation of the land by settlers.130 Moreover, since 
almost all sources of fresh water in the West Bank are located in Area C, 
the area’s resources are essential to the survival of all Palestinians.131 The 
Israeli Civil Administration, in addition to both the Israeli members of 
the PWC and the military, may veto Palestinian water projects in Area 
C.132 Thus, there are three levels of Israeli control which may veto 
Palestinian water projects in the West Bank.  
For settlers, the JWC alone approved 95% wastewater projects, 100% 
of Water Supply Network projects, and 100% of Well projects.133 By 
comparison, for Palestinians, the JWC denied 58% of Wastewater 
projects, 50% of the Water Supply Network projects, and 49% of the 
Wells projects.134 This, of course, does not include the possibility of 
being denied by the military or the Civil Administration of Area C. 
Taken together these measures represent a means to frustrate the 
endeavors of the local population of the West Bank in using water 
resources in the region. This has led the World Bank to conclude that the 
“JWC has not fulfilled its role of providing an effective collaborative 
governance framework for joint resource management and 
investment.”135 The JWC is a broken mechanism; the local population 
should not have to rely on the final authority of the occupying power to 
begin benign water projects.  
C. Displacing the Local Population in Contravention of 
International Law 
Water resources have been restricted to the local population to such a 
degree as to constitute an appropriation in contravention of international 
  
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. What is Area C?, supra note 126. 
 132. SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, supra note 121, at 143. 
 133. Jan Selby, Cooperation, Domination and Colonisation: The Israeli-
Palestinian Joint Water Committee, 6 WATER ALTERNATIVES 1, 12 (2013). 
 134. Id. 
 135. ASSESSMENT ON RESTRICTIONS OF WATER SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 
90, at ix. 
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law. In addition to the structural mechanisms that prohibit expansion of 
water resource projects of the West Bank’s local population, the local 
population has suffered tremendous hardship and loss because of the 
limited allocation of water, and thus, members of the population are 
forced to leave. For example, according to one Palestinian villager,  
“There is no water in the village, so we have to bring it from far away 
and it’s   expensive. I can’t wash and clean as often as needed. We 
can’t afford it. It’s a daily struggle. The goats also need to drink. We 
can’t keep more goats because we can’t afford the water, and we can’t 
grow food for us and fodder for the animals, so we have to buy it and 
this too is expensive.”136  
 
The limitations on water rights make prohibitive not only the needs of 
daily domestic life, but also the sustenance of agriculture and livestock. 
Since water has been deprived to such a significant degree, and diverted 
to the populations of the settlements in the West Bank, it constitutes a 
taking of public property in violation of Regulation 53 of Hague IV.137 
While a taking is also a separate violation of IHL, here it buttresses, in a 
fashion similar to the one envisioned by the Court in Yeager,138 the 
forcible transfer of the local population.  
The appropriation of water also constitutes the obstruction and 
destruction of resources, in violation of international law. The structural 
system described above, including military orders, the Oslo Accords, and 
Israel’s Civil Administration, have had a crippling effect on agricultural 
activities of the local population of the West Bank.139 Those who do not 
obey the rules of this structure—by using water in contravention of 
Israeli orders—risk having their crops, fields, property, and equipment 
destroyed by military bulldozers, as was witnessed by Amnesty 
International in 2008.140 Destruction of property is not only a 
contributing condition to the forced transfer of the local population, but it 
also violates Article 53 of the Geneva Convention prohibiting the 
destruction of property in an occupied territory.141  
  
 136. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 107, at 23. 
 137. Convention IV, supra note 12, art. 53.  
 138. See Yeager, 1987 WL 503859, at *11.  
 139. Id. at 13, 17. 
 140. Id. at 43-44.  
 141. Convention IV, supra note 12, art. 53. 
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In addition to violating both Hague and Geneva laws, several 
international observers have concluded that the water policy in the West 
Bank is “working”: the local population is leaving the West Bank in 
search of a sustainable life. For example, according to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, “[Israel’s] settlement policy of confiscating land and 
imposing restrictions on water resources has meant that a large 
proportion of the population that would normally have earned a living by 
traditional agriculture have gradually begun to seek employment in Israel 
as unskilled workers.”142 While the local population of the West Bank is 
committed to continuing to live in their traditional homes, water is, as 
this paper has noted, an indispensable resource. The severe, plain, and 
inequitable distribution of water in the West Bank is forcing the local 
population to leave.  
Other international observers have also found Israel to manifest a 
sinister intent in its water policies. According to an international fact-
finding mission on Israeli settlements in the occupied territories by the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “[t]he denial of 
water is used to trigger displacement, particularly in areas slated for 
expansion, especially since these communities are mostly farmers and 
herders.”143 The continued expansion of Israeli settlements, coupled with 
the exodus of the local population, will continue to confirm the existence 
of a constructive forced transfer policy. The distribution of water in the 
West Bank, structurally engineered by Israeli authorities, and codified 
and endorsed by both the Israeli government and the PLO, constitutes a 
constructive forced transfer in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.144 It also violates Israel’s duty to not “materially” 
  
 142. U.N. Secretary-General, Economic and Social Consequences of the 
Establishment of Settlements by Israel in the Palestinian Territory, Including Jerusalem, 
and the Syrian Golan: Rep. of Secretary-General, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. A/47/294-E/1992/84 
(July 7, 1992). 
 143. Human Rights Council, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to 
Investigate the Implications of the Israeli Settlements on the Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights of the Palestinian People Throughout the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, ¶ 88, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/63 (Feb. 7, 
2013) (emphasis added). 
 144. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, supra note 7, art. 49. 
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alter the demographic composition of the region, in violation of the 
Security Council Resolution 446.145 
IV.  POLICY SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THE CONDITIONS OF WATER 
ALLOCATION IN THE WEST  
While water may be a scarce resource, both Israelis and Palestinians 
have the potential to enjoy water in the region free from discrimination. 
Given the egregious levels of discrimination, the problem is innately a 
human-made one, not an environmental one. This means that the 
problem can be solved through proactive and targeted policy changes. 
First, both Israel and the authorities of the West Bank (currently the 
PLO) must establish a surveying mechanism for the West Bank whereby 
all residents of the West Bank have access to an equal amount of water 
per capita. Thus, if water shortages exist, water entering areas with an 
extremely high lpcd, including settlements, must have their water 
diverted to areas where water scarcity exists. A complaints commission 
must be set up and composed of an equal number of Palestinians and 
Israelis. This commission should be empowered to hear complaints by 
Israelis and Palestinians living in the West Bank, to make final, 
authoritative recommendations on water-related issues, and have 
authority over all water projects in the region. This panel’s decisions 
should be based on simple majority voting procedures, and should be 
composed of members from different, but relevant, backgrounds, 
including, but not limited to, lawyers, engineers, and environmental 
scientists. Such a panel should have the ultimate goal of providing equal 
access to water to all residents in the West Bank, but must also take care 
to ensure that such levels are above the minimum international standards 
noted in this paper. In addition to receiving complaints, such a 
commission should also examine the situation of water in particularly 
disadvantaged areas (particularly where access to water is below thirty 
lpcd). 
Second, given the provisional and legally problematic nature of 
settlements, no settlement should be created within a designated radius of 
a Palestinian village, nor any Palestinian village that existed in 1967. 
This will ensure that water is not being used for the explicit purpose of 
  
 145. S.C. Res. 446, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446, at 4 (Mar. 22, 1979). 
2016] The Denial of Water as a Forcible Transfer 305 
transferring the local population to make way for Israeli settlements. The 
problematic nature of settlements already triggers the ire of most states in 
the world, as well as international organizations including the UN. 
Demonstrating to the world community that there is no actual active 
policy to displace Palestinians, especially by using a resource as precious 
as water, is particularly important for an eventual reconciliation. It is 
certainly true that, regarding Israel’s Military Orders in the West Bank, 
the Israeli government has legitimate concerns vis-à-vis its own security 
and with security in the West Bank. Regarding these security concerns, 
the Israeli High Court of Justice eloquently noted:  
As any other Israelis, we too recognize the need to defend the country 
and its citizens against the wounds inflicted by terror. . . . [W]e are 
convinced that at the end of the day, a struggle according to the law 
will strengthen . . . [Israel’s] power and her spirit. There is no security 
without law.146  
 
Finally, both the Israeli government and the Palestinian authority must 
commit to update the water needs for individuals living in the West 
Bank, and ensure that these needs are computed and presented on a per 
capita basis, not one that discriminates based on ethnicity, religion, 
nationality, or citizenship. Thus, the “Palestinian” needs versus the 
“settler” needs dichotomy should not exist. If needed, Israel should 
provide subsidies for water for those individuals—Israeli or 
Palestinian—who cannot access the water network so they may access 
the minimum standard of water requirements established by the WHO. 
This would not only provide required, recurring, and productive 
meetings between high-level politicians on both sides of the conflict, it 
would also allow for greater dialogue and cooperation between Israelis 
and Palestinians. Israel cannot be expected to control the effects of 
climate change. However, it should be expected to ensure it does not 
hoard whatever water is available, forcing the West Bank Palestinian 
population to leave. A non-discriminatory policy would ensure that both 
sides face harder periods of drought together, as comrades, but also share 
the joy of water surpluses as companions. It would promote collegiality 
for a conflict that has seen bitterness for too long.  
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CONCLUSION 
The denial of adequate water to the West Bank, an occupied territory, 
constitutes a forced transfer under international law. The denial of 
adequate water has caused the relocation of the local population of the 
West Bank, effectively ghettoizing the local population in areas with 
better, though often not adequate, access to water, mostly in Areas A and 
B. This forced transfer has ushered the construction of Israeli settlements 
into the former homes of Palestinians in Area C. In addition to causing 
great human suffering, the policies implemented by Israel in relation to 
water constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, and may one 
day lead to prosecutions for violations under the laws and customs of 
warfare.  
Refashioning Israel’s water policy and allowing greater water 
independence to Palestinians would improve economic activity and 
quality of life in the West Bank, and would build tremendous confidence 
between the two sides. If Israelis and Palestinians can work together to 
provide adequate water to two peoples, it would presage a fruitful future 
of mutual cooperation and trust and contribute to the end of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  
 
